Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty
Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Accounting and Finance

9-21-2010

Auditor Independence: Third Party Hiring and Paying Auditors
Silvia Romero
Montclair State University, romeros@mail.montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/acctg-finance-facpubs
Part of the Accounting Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Romero, Silvia, "Auditor Independence: Third Party Hiring and Paying Auditors" (2010). Department of
Accounting and Finance Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 32.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/acctg-finance-facpubs/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Accounting and Finance at Montclair
State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Accounting and Finance
Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1450-2194.htm

EMJB
5,3

Auditor independence: third
party hiring and paying auditors

298

Department of Accounting, Law and Taxation, Montclair State University,
Montclair, New Jersey, USA

Silvia Romero

Abstract
Purpose – Although the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) has introduced rules to avoid auditor
independence impairment, there are still issues that are not sufficiently solved. The purpose of this
paper is to discuss the problems of auditor independence that arise by auditors being hired and paid
by the auditee, and by SOX requiring rotation of only the lead audit partner.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper takes the form of a discussion paper, exploring
alternatives to overcome the mentioned issues of independence.
Findings – The paper presents an alternative where auditors are hired and paid by an external third
party. Besides this change, it also proposes a quality control system including the extension of the CPE
program. A private entity in representation of the investors (e.g. Stock exchange) and an oversight
board (e.g. PCAOB) as alternatives to hire, pay and control audit quality are discussed.
Practical implications – This paper has implications for regulators, since it presents a new
alternative for hiring and paying auditors that requires an active involvement of an independent third
party. It also has implications for professional bodies by increasing their participation in monitoring
and training its members.
Originality/value – The paper presents an original alternative for avoiding independence issues
derived by auditors being hired and paid by the auditee, and opens a discussion in a new solution to an
old problem.
Keywords Auditors, Outsourcing, Auditor’s fees, United States of America, Europe
Paper type Viewpoint

1. Introduction
Auditors certify that Financial Statements are reasonably accurate and provide
adequate disclosure. Since different users rely on this information for their
decision-making, the issue of independence of the auditor has been a fundamental
one for regulators, practitioners and researchers. As stated by Moore et al. (2006):
Independence is the only justification for the existence of accounting firms that provide
outside audits; if it were not for the claim of independence, there would be no reason for
outside auditors to exist, since their function would be redundant with that of a firm’s inside
auditors.
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In order to ensure independence, the only relationship between the company and the
auditor has to be the audit task. The European Union has established a set of directives
that provide accounting rules that have to be followed by the members. The objective
of these directives is “to require companies in the jurisdiction of the Member States to
fulfill a minimum set of common obligations to further the establishment of an
undistorted system of competition, to ensure in all the Member States some protection
for people in business relations with companies and thus assist the companies’
economic development” (European Union Fact Sheets, 2001). The International

Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2009), through the International Auditing and
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) develops the International Standards on
Assurance Engagements (ISAEs), with the purpose of serving “the public interest by
setting high quality auditing, assurance, quality control and related services standards
and by facilitating the convergence of international and national standards . . . ” Section
290 of the Code of Ethics released in July 2009 requires the rotation of the partner of the
audit team every seven years with two years time-out, unless exempt by the
independent regulator, and the non provision of some non-audit services. It also
requires the review of an accountant that is not member of the firm if the audit fees
exceed 15 percent of the total fees of the firm for two years, and the prohibition of
compensation or evaluation of auditors based on the success in selling non-audit
services.
After the 2000 scandals of Enron, WorldCom, etc. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of
2002 introduced rules to increase independence. These rules include the prohibition to
provide other services in conjunction with the audit, the rotation of the auditors, and
conflicts of interest resulting from employment relationships. However, some of them
do not seem to be strong enough. For example, SOX requires the rotation of auditors
every five years, but only of the lead audit partner, which is not protective enough
because of inter group membership relations and behavior, as will be discussed in
section 2.2. Other rules in SOX seem to be more effective in increasing the degree of
independence, for example the prohibition of non-auditing services like systems design
and implementation, provided simultaneously with auditing services. Finally, there are
threats to independence that are completely ignored in the act, for example, the fact
that auditors are paid by the auditee, which creates incentives to issue favorable
reports to keep the client.
In 2009, auditors have been involved in new scandals. In the Bernard Madoff fraud,
the auditor is investigated for conducting sham audits (Efrati, 2009). In the New
Century investigation, the lawsuit alleges that the auditors were negligent trying to
protect the business relationship and the audit fees (Kardos, 2009). These and other
scandals provide evidence of the limitations of SOX in terms of auditor independence.
If the auditors were regularly rotated and paid by someone other than the client, the
incentives to conceal schemas to keep the client might disappear.
In this paper these two issues are addressed, rotation of the audit team and who
pays for the audit, and a new structure to avoid these factors of risk of independence
impairment is proposed.
2. Background
2.1 The role of auditing
Although accounting can be traced over 70,000 years back in Africa, and to 3,000 BC
with Mesopotamians keeping records of their business transactions (Tinker and Sy,
2006), the origin of auditing is to be linked to the Egypt, Greece and Rome ancient
empires. Boyd (1968) explains that it developed as a need to control that officials
worked for the empire insted of enriching themselves. A report by the Instituto de
Censores Jurados de Cuentas de España (1976, p. 14) indicates that there are tasks that
can be related to auditing in Italy in the Middle Age, and that England had reviewers
as early as the XIII Century. Similarly to the ancient empires, this report explains that
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the role of the controller in Kingdoms and Courts in Europe developed as a need to
control collections and payments as well as revenues and expenses.
Auditing, as a regulated profession, starts much later after industrialization and the
birth of corporations. As described in the forementioned report, during the first half of
the XIX Century in England, railroad companies without solvency as well as
cooperatives created without financial guarantees, started to go into bankruptcy. To
avoid the damage produced in working people’s wealth, the government hired
accoutants to overview the bankruptcies and liquidations. The especialization of these
reviewers led to the development of auditing as a profession (p. 16), regulated by the
Companies Act of 1929. Montgomery (1949, p. 9) state that when the businessmen
found that the value received from the work of an experienced auditor exceeded the
cost of the servies, that relation became a continuing one. The Companies Act of 1948
introduced competence requirements for auditors. In France, the auditor and the
accountant professions are organized separatelly. In 1867 the “Institution du
commissariat aux comptes” was created in corporations, and an audit report on the
Financial Statements was required, but auditing was regulated by law in 1935 and
1936. Other countries like Germany had the first regulation of auditing and accounting
in the 1930s as well, while Spain regulated the profession in 1945, although it was not
fully developed until the 1970s.
Similarly, in the United States, auditing was introduced as a necessity after the
Great Depression. At that time, “Regulations and laws were viewed as necessary for
survival because it could alleviate public criticism by providing a (sometimes false)
assurance that corporations would be held accountable for their actions”. (Lehman,
1992) President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration proposed legislation to protect
investors and other external parties, by requiring the disclosure of relevant and
material facts about public companies. Furthermore, other rules were directed to
prohibit deceit and misrepresentations of the information disclosed. In this direction,
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the SEC,
and required publicly traded firms to file financial reports reviewed by independent
outside auditors.
The second section of the Securities Act of 1934 fundaments the necessity for
regulation indicating that:
[. . .] transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and
matters related thereto [. . .].

By regulating, the legislators try to resolve the conflict of interest of different parties in
the community, assuming the role of a neutral party committed to common interest.
The independent review turns auditors into public watchdogs, according to the
definition given by Warren Burger on behalf of a unanimous US Supreme Court
(United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 1984).
The evolution of technology has changed what is expected from auditing. For
example, the availability of computer networking makes it possible to redesign the
auditing architecture around online auditing (Vasarhelyi, 2002). It is also possible to
perform a type of auditing which produces audit results simultaneously with or a
short period of time after the occurrence of relevant events, (Continuous Auditing
(CA) as defined by Vasarhelyi (2002)). In this paper, Vasarhelyi states that it would be

more accurate to call it instant rather than continuous auditing, and that it will turn
the audit process to an audit by exception. If auditors control instantaneously, they
could produce an evergreen report and notify conditions that affect that report when
they occur. Although it is desirable to have assurance on information disclosed to
guarantee user’s protection, this reporting structure might originate new
independence issues. While auditors controlling continuously have more knowledge
of the strengths and weaknesses of the controls and reporting mechanisms of the
company, by participating in this process, their independence might be compromised.
If auditors produce an evergreen report, how independent can they be at the time of
the annual audit report? Can they produce an unfavorable report if they are not
satisfied with the company’s book closing after they have been giving the evergreen?
We can certainly think of some structure in which annual reports are no longer
required, but as long as they are, the information they contain includes accruals
added at the time of the close, that affect the corporation’s income and need to be
included in the auditor’s report.
2.2 Auditor independence
Montgomery (1949) presents a summary of duties and liabilities that apply to auditors
based on the English decisions and the principles of the common law in force in the
USA Among them, he states that the auditor’s relation with the client has to be
confidential, but “if his position as auditor becomes incompatible with honesty, he may
withdraw at any time”, which indicates a requirement of independence of the auditor.
There are different definitions of auditor independence as well as different variables
used to measure independence. The AICPA (2006) provides one that relates
independence with ethics and expertise by establishing that
Independence implies one’s ability to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and
professional skepticism. Therefore, independence is critical to promote ethical behavior and
reliable financial reporting.

Antle (1984) defines auditor independence with consideration of conflict of interests
produced when an auditor’s personal interest affects the auditing outcome; requiring
non-cooperative behavior for independence. The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) does not
include a definition of auditor independence, but in section 2, it determines rules to
guarantee such independence. These rules refer to non audit activities that cannot be
performed by auditors for their clients in order to reduce conflict of interest (like
bookkeeping, actuarial services, information systems design, management), rotation of
partners every five years, and reporting to the audit committee.
The requirement of independence of the auditor is present in Europe as well. The
European Union has established a set of directives that provide accounting rules that
have to be followed by the members. The objective of these directives (European Union
Fact Sheets, 2001) is:
[. . .] to require companies in the jurisdiction of the Member States to fulfill a minimum set of
common obligations to further the establishment of an undistorted system of competition, to
ensure in all the Member States some protection for people in business relations with
companies and thus assist the companies’ economic development.

While the fifth directive regulates the structure of public limited liability companies
and the powers of their management, the eighth council directive (84/253/EEC of April
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1984) regulates the audit profession. The requirements imposed by the directive are
that the auditor has to be a person of good repute with professional competence, who is
not involved in an incompatible activity; thus, it requires independence of the auditor.
The Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 17 May
2006 amends the Council Directive 84/253/EEC (European Parliament, 2006). This
directive requires that all approved auditors should be included in a register accessible
to the public (European Parliament, 2006).
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), through the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) develops the International
Standards on Assurance Engagements (ISAEs), with the purpose of serving “the
public interest by setting high quality auditing, assurance, quality control and related
services standards and by facilitating the convergence of international and national
standards . . . ” Section 290 of the Code of Ethics released in July 2009 requires the
rotation of the partner of the audit team every seven years with two years time-out,
unless exempt by the independent regulator, and the non provision of some non audit
services. It also requires the review of an accountant that is not member of the firm if
the audit fees exceed 15 percent of the total fees of the firm for two years, and the
prohibition of compensation or evaluation of auditors based on the success in selling
non-audit services.
Among the variables considered in research as determinants of auditor
independence, these are the most extensively used:
.
Firm size: Since a big firm is expected to have more clients, each client is
expected to affect less its income; therefore, the auditor has less incentives to
report favorably to keep the client (Reynolds and Francis, 2000; Mautz and
Sharaf, 1961; Gul, 1991; McKinley et al., 1985; DeAngelo, 1981), This variable
does not consider the number of clients of the audit firm or its importance. A big
firm may have many clients but if one of them accounts for a large percentage of
its income, the incentive to report to keep the client still exists. There is no
attempt to avoid this threat in the US, but in Europe the Code of Ethics requires
special controls in case of audit fees being more than 15 percent of total fees of
the firm for two years.
.
Audit and Non-audit fees: The combination of audit and non-audit fees,
especially when the second exceeds the first, as used to happen in many
companies, gives incentives to auditors to report favorably to keep the client.
Besides, when auditors have participated in consulting services like the
development of information systems, the evaluation of those systems might be
affected by their participation in the design (Palmrose, 1986; Parkash and
Venable, 1993), Both the US and Europe have measures in place to control for the
provision of simultaneous services to the client.
.
Identification with the client and long-term relationships between auditee and
auditor: This issue has generated a long debate with studies finding that audit
quality decreases as auditor tenure increases (Deis and Giroux, 1992; Dopuch
et al., 2001). Tenure may result in friendships developed with the auditee, which
might impair independence if the auditor feels he belongs to the auditee’s group.
Also, the auditor might rely in previous years’ auditing and relax his evaluation
without detecting new events that might change his assessment. Moore et al.

.

(2006) develop a theory of moral seduction proposing that violations might occur
without any conscious intention, and that ethical lapses occur gradually,
therefore increasing the probability of occurrence with tenured auditors.
Managers hiring and firing auditors: “This client/auditor relationship is
probably a larger source of lack of independence than many of the issues
extensively discussed in the literature” (Vasarhelyi, 2002).

The focus of this paper is on the problem of rotation of audit teams, as well as auditors
being hired, fired and paid by the auditee. An alternative structure to avoid this
independence issue is proposed as well.
2.2.1 Auditors hired, fired and paid by the auditee. When the auditor is hired, fired
and paid by the auditee, the client can choose the auditor who will most likely deliver a
favorable audit opinion. The auditor will use his professional judgment and accept or
not the engagement, but as found in previous research, the outcome of the audit will
affect the relationship between auditors and clients (Levinthal and Fichman, 1988;
Seabright et al., 1992; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Chow and Rice, 1982).
Therefore, if the auditee does not hire and pay the auditors, the auditor does not need to
produce a report that matches the auditee’s expectation to keep the client.
Different countries require that every public company must have an audit
committee composed of members of the board of directors, which has a function of
oversight over the financial reporting system, the internal controls and the independent
auditors (SEC, 2003). When there is no designated body, the whole board of directors
has the responsibility of the committee. In terms of external audit, this committee is in
charge of the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the auditors, who
have to report to the committee as well. It is also a forum the auditors have to discuss
concerns related to their duties without the intervention of the managers, with the
purpose of guaranteeing that “the management properly develops and adheres to a
sound system of internal controls, that procedures are in place to objectively assess
management’s practices and internal controls, and that the outside auditors, through
their own review, objectively assess the company’s financial reporting practices”. The
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (UK, July 2003) requires two to three
independent non-executive directors. Among its functions, it is the role of the audit
committee to appoint, re-appoint, remove and pay the auditor, to monitor the external
auditor’s independence, and to develop a policy in terms of provision of non-audit
services by auditors. In many cases the committee proved not to be effective in its
mandate given the fraudulent events involving managers and auditors in the
beginning of the XXI Century both in Europe and the USA.
The Sarbanes Oxley Act introduced new rules in order to improve its effectiveness
and among them it requires independence of the members of the committee. These
independence requirements prohibit the members to act as consultants of the company,
and to be affiliated with the company or a subsidiary. As stated in the SEC final rule,
“an independent audit committee with adequate resources helps to overcome this
problem and to align corporate interests with those of the shareholders”. This means
that even when the audit committee is involved in the process of hiring, firing, and
paying for the audit, their interests could be biased towards those of the stockholders,
which might affect the interest of other stakeholders, as will be discussed in section 3.
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2.2.2 Rotating only the lead audit partner. In the European Union, Section 209 of the
Code of Ethics released in July 2009 (IFAC) requires the rotation of the partner of the
audit team every seven years with two years time-out unless exempted by the
independent regulator. The exemption may be granted when the firm has only a few
people with the required skills to serve as an audit partner, and the independent
regulator has provided safeguards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires the
rotation of the audit partner every five years.
Section 208-4 of the SOX, explains the rotation of audit partner by “balancing the
need to bring a ’fresh look’ to the audit engagement with the need to maintain
continuity and audit quality”. This requirement tries to avoid the identification of the
auditor with the client produced by familiarity or close relationships. Moore et al. (2006)
extensively discuss how economic and social incentives influence auditor’s decisions.
Some of these incentives can be explained by the social identity theory developed by
Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986). According to this theory,
individuals identify themselves with a group due to their membership, and they feel
identical to the people in that group. Studies in inter group behavior indicate that
individuals within a group hold positive perceptions about other group members, give
higher acceptance of their outcomes regardless of the message quality, and are willing
to protect them and cooperate with them (Brewer, 1979; Brewer and Kramer, 1985;
Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Levine et al., 2002; Abrams et al., 1990; Mackie et al. 1992).
On the other hand, research found that individuals distrust or are suspicious of
members of other groups (Kramer, 1994, Kramer and Messick, 1998). If the auditor has
strong relationships with the client, he/she might feel part of the client’s group and bias
the audit to protect the interests of the client, while they are expected to act with
suspicion. Montgomery (1949, p. 8) states that:
[. . .] the general rule of the common law, that all men are considered honest until proved
dishonest, may be observed by an auditor with respect to the staff of the client; but he is
charged with an exceptional degree of diligence in recognizing indications of dishonesty on
the part of those who occupy responsible positions.

SOX and the European regulations assume that by rotating the audit partner, those ties
of familiarity and membership do not develop, but new auditing leaders might try to
protect the results of previous engagements because of their membership to the same
audit firm, and the bonds they have created as in-group members.
3. Previous solutions to the independence issue in literature
Different alternatives have been proposed to avoid this risk of independence
impairment. Moore et al. (2006) suggest that auditors should be hired not by the
managers but by the audit committee of the board of directors, and that within a period
of five years, the client should not be able to fire the auditor. The advantages of this
proposed solution is that it would eliminate the incentives to please the client with a
positive opinion during the five years of the contract, after which auditors should be
changed (not the partner but the firm) to avoid the identification with the client.
However, as discussed by Nelson (2006), this alternative might result in a company
unable to switch a poor quality auditor. A second drawback of this solution is that it
looks at the traditional role of auditors as watchdogs of investors in an era in which the
number of stakeholders has increased. Employees, customers, vendors, creditors, even

the comunities in which the company is settled have to be protected. If the auditor is
hired by the Board of Directors, the auditor needs to be aligned only with the owners’
interests, and other external stakeholders are completely unprotected. For example, if
the company is involved in tax evasion, or does not comply with environmental rules
and the auditor oversees those facts, owners might have better returns, but the
community’s interests are affected. The lack of protection of some stakeholders is not
apparent due to the structure of the current reporting model, which requires different
reports without audit certification for different purposes; for example taxes or
environmental reports are produced independently of financial statements. If the
current reporting model evolves as expected (Vasarhelyi and Alles, 2006), meaningful
reports will be provided based on a unique database, and auditors will have to assess
on them.
Other alternatives to deal with this independence issue were proposed in literature.
Ronen (2002), Elliott (2002) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2005) propose a model where
public companies purchase financial statement insurance from insurance companies in
order to indemnify against misstatements. Ronen (2002) proposes that before setting
the premium, the insurance company hires auditors to assess the risk of misstatements.
The board of directors decides how much insurance to buy, and the premium acts as an
indicator. Similarly, Bhattacharjee et al. (2005) propose a framework where regulators
require public companies to purchase insurance to indemnify their financial statements
against material misstatements, and the insurance company hires an auditor as an
underwriter to assess the risk of material misstatement. Elliott (2002) presents an
online reporting model in which the users pay for the assurance. He states that since
online reports make it possible to identify what information was used and by whom, an
online contract can be established. In this insurance transaction model the insured is
paid for the losses caused by faulty information. The advantage of the insurance model
solution is the change in the agency relationship to the insurance company acting as
the principal, so that auditors do not need to please the managers in order to keep their
future income. However, as in Moore’s solution, it only looks for the protection of the
shareholders, since the board of directors decides how much insurance to buy. The
desired level of risk of other stakeholders is not included in the decision since they do
not have representation in the board of directors. Another drawback of this solution is
that since there is a promise to indemnify against the cost of a wrong decision, the
quality of information is not important as long as there is financial capacity to meet the
contract obligations.
Vasarhelyi (2002) analyzes different alternatives of payment for Continuous
Assurance, and presents a new model in which clients of continuous assurance pay for
it. He proposes investors paying a fee for an “evergreen” report, banks paying for
continuous monitoring, banks charging lower mortgage/loan fees for continuously
monitored clients, insurance companies paying for certain assurances, insurance firms
charging lower fees for continuous monitoring, and customers and creditors paying for
continuous assurance of the health of the organization. This model of users of financial
and non-financial information, paying for it and indirectly paying for its assurance, is
supported by Elliott (2002) as well. Going further, the alternative of investors paying
for assurance can be associated to the stock exchange paying for assurance. The
problems and benefits of this alternative are discussed in section 4.3.
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4. Proposed solution
Two questions have to be addressed when suggesting alternatives to the current
payment structure: who pays for the audit and who selects or hires the auditors. Hence,
some of the solutions mentioned in the previous section are incomplete. Moore et al.
(2006) address the second issue, while Vasarhelyi (2002) addresses only the first one.
The alternative of paying insurance is the only one that considers both components;
the insurance company hires and pays the auditors, while the client pays the premium.
However, this model has the drawbacks mentioned in the previous section.
4.1 Who hires and pays auditors? – Theoretical framework
As discussed in section 2.2, there is an independence issue produced by auditors being
hired and paid by the auditee. Ronen (2002) posits that there is an inherent conflict of
interest between the management (principal) and the auditor (agent) because the
“former structures the financial relation with the auditor to induce a clean opinion on
the financial statements even when it is not justified”. This conflict can be resolved by
creating a principal-agent relationship with a principal aligned with the interests of the
parties affected by the audited information. In the existing solutions to address this
conflict, shareholders are considered the only intended beneficiaries of the auditor’s
attestation. However, it is proposed in this paper that not only the shareholders, but the
stakeholders, have to be considered as principals in this relationship.
The debate about which managers are accountable to for their actions has two
confronting theories. One of them considers that managers are accountable only to
shareholders, while the other surpasses the shareholders and includes the society in
which the business operates. Dodd (1932) views business corporations as institutions
with a social service as well as a profit making function. He differentiates companies in
industries like railroads, gas, electricity, and telephone, which have limitations on
unqualified pursuit private profit, from strictly private companies. These companies,
outside the public utility field, do not provide protection to customers under the
assumption that it is guaranteed through competition. However, he posits that a
planned economy is needed to stabilize the system of production and employment, so
that the system moves from one purely for the profit of the stockholders to one that
includes the surrounding society. Aligned with this concept, Dodd transcribes Mr Owe
D. Young’s conception of what a business executive’s attitude should be, and he
mentions three groups of interests in a corporation: the owners, the employees, and the
general public, in which he includes the customers. However, neither Young nor Dodd
provide a definition of a stakeholder. Freeman (1984, p. 49) indicates that the origins of
the term are difficult to track down. In his book “Strategic Management, A Stakeholder
Approach”, he includes the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) definition: “those groups
without whose support the organization would cease to exist”. Besides stockholders,
these groups include employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society. Freeman
further explains that the idea of the SRI’s researchers was that “unless executives
understood the needs and concerns of these stakeholder groups, they could not
formulate corporate objectives which would receive the necessary support for the
continued survival of the firm”. Hence, Dodd and the SRI agree in that besides the
stockholders, other groups of interest are affected by the corporations’ activities and
therefore need to be protected, which has become apparent in the recent financial crisis,
where the social effect of corporate failure has been especially harmful.

Based on the previous discussion and in order to create a new principal-agent
relationship, the proposed solution introduces a third party in the game who acts as
mediator hiring auditors and collecting money from companies to pay for the audits.
This structure eliminates the incentives for the auditors to produce reports to keep the
client, because it is the third party who decides the retention of the auditor. Also, by
having a third party to pay for the audit, any monetary incentive for the auditor to
compensate for the risk of a low quality report also disappears.
A payment strategy has to be appropriately determined, so that the mechanism
does not affect economically the companies or the auditing firms.
Previous studies have looked at the composition of audit fees. Simunic (1980)
includes:
.
size of the auditee;
.
complexity of the auditee’s operations;
.
auditing problems associated with certain financial statement components
especially inventories and receivables;
.
the industry of the auditee; and
.
whether the auditee is a public or a private company.
Based on this, one alternative of payment for the audit may be determined by public
companies being charged a fee based on firm size (assets and revenue). Since this
alternative does not consider the benefits a good internal control system provides to the
audit; a more refined schema could weight the fees companies pay by complexity of the
engagement. These weights should be determined as function of historical
relationships between audit fees and size measures of the company, and be modified
each year with data pertaining to the new audit. Auditors are finally paid by the
designated independent party based on the number of hours applied to the
engagement.
In terms of hiring auditors, it is proposed that the audit firm is selected by the
independent party and hired for a limited time to avoid the effect of inter-group
behavior discussed in the section 2. The Sarbanes Oxley act asks for change every five
years, like Moore et al. (2006). Nelson (2006) suggests it should be more frequent. Given
that there is a trade-off between the benefits of specific knowledge of the company and
the effect of long term relationships, a rotation of the whole auditing company every
three to five years seems appropriate. The audit firm is assigned blindly based on firm
characteristics like size and expertise in the auditee’s industry.
4.2 How can quality be improved?
To improve audit quality, two strategies are proposed. First, the designated third party
has to have access to the audit documentation, so that at any time, it can control the
auditing engagement by itself or by peer review. Second, involve audit firms in
continuous updating and modernization of their personnel and processes, by
developing periodic quality enhancement certification programs. The respondents of a
survey of firms with less than 100 clients (Oliverio and Newman, 2009) identify
weakness in knowledge of relevant GAAP as a reason for deficiency reports. Since
training is provided through the CPE credits program, the results of the survey suggest
that this program needs to be updated. In an era of changes in rules and automation, it
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seems necessary that an organization like the AICPA develop adequate training
programs to guarantee that auditors are adequately trained to serve the users’
interests. The training program might also enhance training of smaller firms so that
they are prepared to enter the public auditing arena, which will also generate a broader
competence in auditing firms.
In a Continuous Audit (CA) environment, Companies would hire a CA provider to
produce the evergreen report proposed by Vasarhelyi, and independently, the annual
audit would be assigned by a third party. Furthermore, companies with CA
implemented would pay less for their annual audit, since auditors could rely on the
results of the CA. Similar benefits would be expected for companies implementing
continuous control monitoring.
4.3 Third player
The independent third party has to comply with requirements that guarantee its
independence:
.
be an intermediate organism interested in providing users with good quality
reports;
.
be independent from the audit firm and the company; and
.
have no incentives to assign a specific auditor to a specific company.
Stock Exchanges have incentives to be the third party mediator. They are affected by
disclosures from companies, with stock prices changing as a result of a chain effect
when fraud in some company is detected. For example, when Enron collapsed the
entire industry was shaken, particularly the marketing and power generating
companies (Proctor, 2002). Chairman Oxley, in the opening statement of Enron’s
hearing expresses “thankfully, at this point there does not seem to be systemic threat to
the financial markets as a result of Enron’s collapse, but the damage the collapse has
done to the financial position of thousands of Americans will be very difficult to
quantify” (Oxley, 2001).
Besides the benefits produced by tax collection, governments are affected by the
companies’ activities in many ways (environment, employment levels, other services to
the communities like support to libraries, hospitals, research, etc.). If a company is
involved in fraud, the degree of the effect that its actions have on the public
administration will vary according to the circumstances. For example, if the company
is closed, it might leave towns with high levels of unemployment, and the government,
with fewer collections in tax will be forced to intervene to provide residents at least
with the minimum resources to survive until some solution to the unemployment level
is found. The same could happen if the company is affecting the environment in a way
that it needs to be closed or relocated. The damage affects people in other communities
since there are a high number of other stakeholders besides the employees. In addition,
the effect will comprise a long period of time. Vendors for example have to relocate
their production, which also affects their stakeholders. If individuals have their saving
in shares of the company that is being closed, their future is compromised. The same
effect can be observed in employees who receive part of their salary in shares as a
promise of wealth in the future.
This scenario can be recognized in many 2000 scandals. As presented by Chairman
Oxley in the opening statement of the Enron hearing (page 2), Enron’s collapse

produced thousands of employees lose their jobs, besides “11,000 employees who
participated in the company’s 401(k) plan have seen their retirement savings
practically eliminated”. Furthermore, “Enron’s collapse has drained the investment
savings of investors across the country who put their retirement and other investments
into mutual funds, pension funds, and other vehicles that invested in Enron. As a
consequence of this situation, expenses in Medicare/Medicaid increased as well as
expenses in other welfare programs”. A report on the state of the US health sector in
2003 (Hellander, 2003) shows that nearly 75 million US residents lacked insurance for
part 2001/2002, while 18 million lacked insurance coverage for the entire period. While
there are other factors like low income affecting lack of healthcare, unemployment is
certainly one of them. In this report, 20 percent of the individuals with no coverage
were unemployed. Hellander (2003) includes the Bethlehem Steel bankruptcy, where
95,000 employees lost their healthcare benefits, and were invited to purchase
COBRA[1] for six months, but they did not have the funds for that purchase, therefore,
increasing the governmental expenditure in Medicaid.
Unfortunately, this scenario is present in today’s economy, with Ponzi schemas and
the mortgage, financial and car companies’ collapse. These events add to the general
economic crisis, and besides requiring tax-payers money for bailout, put the jobless
rate at its highest level in a quarter century. We can conclude that the failure of a
company affects the expenditures that need to be done with tax collections, and
therefore, the managers are accountable to more than the shareholders as stated by
stakeholders’ theory. Certainly, if this failure is due to malfeasance or fraud, and can be
detected with a good audit, the level of expenditure will decrease.
Given the impact a good audit has in the community as a whole, and the effect of a
bad audit in the federal funds, a government regulating entity in charge of assigning
and paying for audits looks like the most appropriate. As described previously, this
organism would not have any control on the companies, and its function would be only
to assure the quality of the audit to protect all the stakeholders, which is consistent
with the philosophy of the 1934 Act.
4.4 Public oversight boards
Both the European Union and the USA have created boards to oversight, rule and
police the activities of auditors of public firms. Although some of their objectives and
rules are common, others are different depending on the body. The 8th Company Law
Directive of the European Commission requires the members to create public oversight
systems of auditors. Since these systems need to combine the efforts of auditors in
Europe, the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) was created to
coordinate them. This body is composed of non-practitioners representative from the
oversight boards in the Member States. According to the directives of the European
Commission, the public oversight system has the responsibility of:
.
approval and registration of auditors and audit firms;
.
adoption of standards on ethics and internal quality control; and
.
continuous education, quality assurance and disciplinary systems.
These objectives indicate an intention to protect users of financial information by
providing a high quality audit. Among the oversight tasks, the Guidance paper on the
cooperation between competent authorities within the EU, produced by the EGAOB,
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distinguishes between inspections and investigations. Inspections are conducted
regularly to guarantee audit quality, and can be considered preventive; while
investigations are conducted under circumstances where there is suspicion of violation
of laws or rules.
SOX (Section 101) created an oversight board (PCAOB), which federalizes the
control of the auditors, to the extent that auditing firms must be registered in the board
in order to provide audit services. Its mission is to “oversee the auditors of public
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in
the preparation of informative, fair and independent audit reports”.
The PCAOB is a private, non-profit corporation whose board consists of five
full-time members appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after
consulting with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the Secretary of the Treasury. Of the five members, two are required to be
or have been certified public accountants. The duties of the board include the
registration of public accounting firms, the regulation and control of the audit
profession to guarantee independence, ethics and quality, conduct inspections and
investigations, and enforce compliance to the law. According to Section 104, the
PCAOB has to conduct a continuing program of inspections to assess compliance with
the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the SEC, and professional standards, once a
year for firms that provide reports for more than 100 issuers, and at least triennially for
firms that provide reports for fewer issuers. SOX requires that the Board prepares a
written report of each inspection which is distributed to regulatory authorities.
According to its Strategic Plan (PCAOB), the Board is committed to the following
rules:
.
Public interest: protecting investors and serving the public interest.
.
Integrity: maintain the highest possible ethical standards.
.
Excellence: high quality analysis and performance.
.
Effectiveness and efficiency: responsibility in managing resources.
.
Fairness: treating firms in fair, impartial and consistent manner.
.
Flexibility and innovation: committed to forward thinking, anticipate risks, take
action.
.
Accountability: accept responsibility for the Board’s actions.
.
Teamwork: engage outstanding, highly qualified and experienced professionals.
The mission and legal mandates of these two oversight boards, make them a viable
alternative as the proposed independent third party. They have a registry of audit
firms, its size and competencies, and therefore they can assign them to different audits
based on matching characteristics. To guarantee audit quality, two strategies were
proposed in section 4.2. First, the designated third party has to have access to the audit
documentation, so that at any time, it can control the auditing engagement by itself or
by peer review, and both the European and the US boards have included in their
mission an inspection and an investigation role. In the PCAOB it seems that the
inspection process works as required for triennially inspected firms, since public
companies are more likely to switch auditors when their audit firm receives a
deficiency inspection report (Abbott et al., 2008). However, respondents to a survey of

triennial firms with no-deficiency reports agree in that the inspection process should
provide an overall measure of audit quality by including a sample of audits (Oliverio
and Newman, 2009). Second, involve audit firms in continuous updating and
modernization of their personnel and processes, by developing periodic quality
enhancement certification programs. The European oversight boards are still
appropriate candidates since they have training as an objective. The PCAOB does not
have training in its mission, but in conjunction with an organization like the AICPA
has to engage in permanent audit training. The respondents of the mentioned survey
(Oliverio and Newman, 2009) identify weakness in knowledge of relevant GAAP as a
reason identified for deficiency reports, while level of knowledge and skills of the total
audit team was identified as critical factor for achieving the no-deficiency report.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, the problem of auditor independence produced by auditors hired and
paid by companies was discussed. Different alternatives presented in literature to deal
with this issue, which were shown to be incomplete, were presented as well. Finally, the
paper introduces a new structure which is in accordance with the spirit of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, and the beginning of auditing in England, and involves the
nomination of a third party in charge of collecting funds to pay auditors and assign
audit firms to the different audit engagements. This schema would avoid the risk of
auditors pleasing the company to keep the job by changing the principal-agency
relationship. It also extends the concept of principal according to stakeholder theory.
With the purpose of increasing audit quality, a training and recertification function is
added to this organization. Since the European Commission and SOX created boards
with the purpose to oversight audit firms in an effort to protect the public interest,
these oversight boards were proposed for this function. Both of them have already
being assigned some level of audit quality control, and have a registry of auditing
firms, which allows the assignment of audit firms to clients. A second alternative was
presented in which a private third party in representation of investors (stock exchange)
is designated to this function. The final effect of the proposed change is an increase in
the quality control function of the board, an increase in the training of participating
auditors, and an increase of auditor independence by auditors not being hired and paid
by the auditee.
Note
1. COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) is a continuation health
coverage program that allows employees and retirees under certain circumstances, the
continuation of the health coverage at group rates. The program is more expensive than the
coverage for active employees, since the participant has to pay the entire premium (the
employer does not pay anything), but less expensive than individual health plans, available
at: www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_cobra.HTML
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